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An important issue in the debate on voucher systems and school choice is what
eﬀects competition from independent schools will have on public schools. Sweden has
made a radical reform of its system for ﬁnancing schools. Independent and public
schools operate on close to equal terms under a voucher system covering all children.
Sample selection models are estimated, using a data set of about 28000 individuals.
In addition,panel data models are estimated on 288 Swedish municipalities. The
ﬁndings support the hypothesis that school results in public schools improve due to
competition.
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vouchers, school choice, sample selection model, panel data model,instrumental vari-
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The role of independent schools has been an important focus in the debate on the
quality of schooling. A central issue is if the use of public funds to ﬁnance privately
run schools, through voucher schemes or charter schools, may enhance education.
Several states and counties in the US have implemented limited experiments with
such systems. In Europe, several countries have a long tradition of independent
schools subject to a varying degree of government regulation, which also receive
public ﬁn a n c i n gt oav a r y i n gd e g r e e . H o w e v e r ,t oo u rk n o w l e d g e ,n oc o u n t r yh a s
implemented a more complete reform of school ﬁnancing than Sweden did in the
1990s. Two parts of the reform are of particular interest. A voucher system has
replaced the earlier centralized system of ﬁnancing and a parental choice reform has
been instituted.
The Swedish experience is of interest for at least three reasons. First, the reforms
have been radical. Under the Swedish system, municipal schools and independent
schools receive public ﬁnancing on close to equal terms. Provided that they fulﬁll
certain basic requirements, all kinds of schools are eligible, including religious schools
a n ds c h o o l sr u nb yp r o ﬁt corporations. In this respect, Sweden diﬀers from e.g.
Denmark, where private schools have received public funding for a long time, but
where only parent-controlled, non-proﬁt schools receive such funding. Further, the
Swedish system applies to all children. This sets the reform apart from, e.g., the so-
called Milwaukee experiment (See, e.g., Rouse[17] and Greene, Peterson and Du[7].)
which only provides vouchers to low-income groups. There are really only two serious
limitations to the operation of independent schools. In order to receive public funds,
they must pledge not to charge an additional tuition fee from the students. Obviously,
this rules out competition in the price dimension. Further, the freedom in setting
1the rules of admission is limited. In particular, independent schools cannot refuse to
accept low ability students.
Second, the country has experienced a rapid growth in the number of independent
schools due to these reforms. The impact of the reform also diﬀers between diﬀerent
municipalities1 in Sweden. Enrollment in independent schools, at the compulsory
school level, ranges between zero and almost twenty per cent. As Newmark [14]
points out in his criticism of Couch, Shughart and Williams [2], studies of the eﬀects
of competition on public schools are in many cases unlikely to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
eﬀects simply due to low variability in the data. He also questions the likelihood of
competition from independent schools having any marked eﬀect, unless the enroll-
ment in independent schools varies over time. The high variability of private school
enrollment in Sweden over time and space implies that these problems are mitigated.
Finally, unlike many other countries, most of the independent schools do not aim
at any special group of students, such as any religious group. Rather, most of them are
non-denominational and compete with public schools for the same group of students,
which is likely to make any eﬀect of competition more noticeable. Further, the
socioeconomic composition of students attending independent schools is not radically
diﬀerent from those attending public schools, thereby making inference easier.
An empirical analysis of competition between schools is necessary, since the the-
oretical predictions are unclear. On the one hand, public schools may lose the best
teachers and the best students to independent schools which, in turn, may have an
adverse eﬀect on students remaining in public schools. Epple and Romano [5] have
shown theoretically that in the presence of a peer-group eﬀect, i.e. a positive ”learn-
ing externality” from sharing the class-room with more able students, low-ability
1In Sweden, schooling is primarily the responsibility of the municipalities, the lowest tier of
government.
2students may be adversely aﬀected by school choice. Hoxby [10] and Hanushek et
al. [9] ﬁnd empirical evidence supporting the existence of peer group eﬀects. On
the other hand, increased competition and the risk of losing students and resources,
give public schools incentives to improve education and which may lead to more ex-
perimentation with regard to, e.g., pedagogical methods. In addition, competition
may have a beneﬁcial impact on teachers for two reasons. First, it may induce them
to increase their work eﬀort, thus reducing x-ineﬃciency. Second, if public schools
in eﬀect form a monopsony for teachers’ services, competition may result in higher
salaries, which would attract able people to the profession. Both these eﬀects have
been documented empirically. Rapp [15] ﬁnds that teachers work more diligently
when school choice is introduced. Vedder and Hall [20] and Hoxby [12] ﬁnd that
teachers’ salaries tend to rise due to increased competition from private schools.
Competition between schools have received increased attention among econo-
mists. Noting that the predominant form of competition between schools in the
US is through the Tiebout choice, Hoxby [11] examines the eﬀects of varying sizes
of school districts on student performance. The underlying logic is that the Tiebout
choice is more eﬀective when the number of jurisdictions in a given area is large. Her
results suggest that competition through the Tiebout choice enhances the produc-
tivity in public schools. In fact, productivity increases due to changes in both the
numerator and the denominator: Student achievements improve, while the costs of
schooling fall. Hoxby also ﬁnds that private school enrollement is lower where the
Tiebout choice is more intense, plausibly because the demand for private education
is smaller when public schools are of high quality. Since school district boundaries
may be endogenous - there is an incentive to merge poorly performing school dis-
tricts with neighboring districts - Hoxby uses an instrumental variable estimation.
An important methodological ﬁnding is that an estimation that does not take this
3endogeneity into account is biased towards ﬁn d i n gn oe ﬀect of Tiebout choice.
A few papers have explicitly examined the competition between public and private
schools. The question asked in these studies is thus if the achievement of students
in public schools is improved when the proportion of students in private schools is
larger. A central empirical issue in such studies is that the key variable, i.e. the
number of students attending private schools, may be endogenously determined. If
public schools are of poor quality, the demand for private schools may be larger.
If this is not accounted for, the eﬀects of competition may be underestimated. To
address the endogeneity problem, Dee [3] instruments for the private school share,
using the population concentration of Catholics. The rationale for this is that since
many private schools in the US are run by Catholic institutions, this variable will
be highly correlated with the presence of private schools. Dee uses data on school
districts in 18 states in the USA, and ﬁnds that competition signiﬁcantly improves the
high school graduation rates. Hoxby [12] uses a somewhat similar strategy, but uses
a richer set of denominational variables as instruments, and uses data on individual
student achievements. Her conclusion is that competition from private schools has
as i g n i ﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the quality of public schools in terms of educational
attainment, measured as the highest grade completed by the age of 24, wages, also
measured by the age of 24, and high school graduation rates. Couch, Shughart and
Williams [2] also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of competition on public school performance,
using the average scores in a compulsory mathematics test in all counties in North
Carolina. However, this study have been criticized by Newmark [14] who claims that
the results are not robust.
The central contribution of the present paper is that we use an extensive data
set to study the eﬀects of a truly radical reform of school ﬁnancing. Before the
reforms began in the early 1990s, Sweden had a completely centralized school system.
4Financing of schools was mainly provided by the national government. Hardly any
independent or private schools existed. Today, Sweden has more generous rules for
the use of public funds to ﬁnance independent schools than any other country, with
the possible exception of the Netherlands. We use a data set of around 28 000 ninth-
graders in public and independent schools in the scholastic year 1997/98, containing
information on grades, test results and socioeconomic background variables. Our
approach diﬀers somewhat from previous research in that we use sample selection
models in order to simultaneously model both the students’ choice of school and
their educational results. This approach is used to take account of the fact that
students choosing public schools are not a random sample of all students. This is
one of the two key identiﬁcation problems we meet when we want to study how
competition from independent schools aﬀects public schools.
The second identiﬁcation problem is caused by the fact that independent schools
are not established by chance. In particular, the availability of independent schools
may be a function of the quality of public schools, causing the key explanatory
variable to be endogenous. As discussed above, the demand for alternatives to public
education is likely to be greater if public schools are of poor quality. In the Swedish
setting, there may be a counteracting eﬀect on the supply side. The entitlement
to an independent school is determined on the basis of the cost of schooling in the
municipality where it operates. Since independent schools are not allowed to charge
tuition fees, the ﬁnancial viability of an independent school will depend on the policy
of the municipality, and on how ”costly” the students are. In municipalities with
many students with, e.g., limited knowledge of Swedish or with social problems, it
may be diﬃcult to start an independent school.
A complication is that the use of variables on religious aﬃliation as instruments
for the share of independent schools is clearly not appropriate in Sweden. First, only
5a minority of the independent schools are denominational. Second, around 85 percent
of the population belong to the Lutheran Church of Sweden2, and the variability is
small across regions. Instead, we use a number of political variables to construct
an instrument. The motivation for this approach is that if the local authorities are
hostile to independent schools, which in some cases they are, this may limit the
e x p a n s i o no fs u c hs c h o o l s .
A further empirical complication is that unobserved heterogeneity between mu-
nicipalities or between schools may exist. Since the data on individuals are from one
year only, any panel data estimation is ruled out. However, robust standard errors of
the coeﬃcients are estimated. To complement the analysis of the data on individuals,
we also run a separate set of regressions on data from all of Sweden’s municipalities
for the years 1993-1997. We estimate panel data models with the average grades in
the municipalities as the dependent variable.
We ﬁnd that the extent of competition from independent schools, measured as the
proportion of students in the municipality that goes to independent schools, improves
both the test results and the grades in public schools. This is conﬁrmed by the results
from the panel data models. The improvement is signiﬁcant both in statistical and
real terms. This result holds for test results, ﬁnal grades and for the likelihood that
a student will leave school with no failing grades. Thus, our results conﬁrm ﬁndings
from earlier research which indicate that competition is beneﬁcial for students in
public schools.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 treats the Swedish
reforms, and the development since these were enacted. In section 3, the data and
the empirical analysis are presented. Section 4 concludes.
2The Church of Sweden was not disestablished until the year 2000, which accounts for the high
membership rate.
62 The Swedish experience
In Sweden, the compulsory schools have traditionally been the responsibility of the
municipalities, the lowest tier of government. However, the municipal schools op-
erated under strict national rules and regulations, and received funding from the
national government. They also had to follow a national curriculum. Only a few inde-
pendent schools, approved by the government, received government funding. In 1990,
the system was altered and the municipalities were given wider authority over their
o w ns c h o o l s ,a n dw e r ea l s og i v e nf u l lﬁnancial responsibility for the school system.3
In 1992 a new reform was implemented, under which the municipalities are obliged
to give funding to independent schools, amounting to 85 percent of the calculated
average cost per student in the municipal schools. Parents were also given the right to
choose school for their children. The purpose of the reform was to give independent
schools funding on terms equal to those of municipal schools. The 85 percent-rule
was introduced to account for administrative costs and over-head costs related to the
municipalities’ over-all responsibility for the educational system.4 Similar reforms
have been instituted for the upper secondary schools (”gymnasium”- roughly equiv-
alent to high school). However, this paper mainly deals with compulsory schooling,
w h i c hi nS w e d e ni sn i n ey e a r s ,f r o ma g es e v e nt oﬁfteen.
The independent schools must be approved by the National Agency for Educa-
tion to receive funding. There are some provisions for approval. The schools must
meet certain quality requirements, and must work in line with the targets set for the
3A general reform of the ﬁnancial relationship between the diﬀerent tiers of government has meant
that municipalities pay to or receive money from the central government based on various socio-
economic and demographic variables. This has largely replaced an earlier system with ear-marked
subsidies to schooling, care for the elderly, and other municipal responsibilities.
4The grounds for calculating the grants given to independent schools were altered in 1995, in-
cluding some costs not previously included, and instead reducing the percentage rule from 85 to 75.
The rules were altered again in 1996. It is a matter of debate whether the independent schools are
over- or undercompensated, in comparison with municipal schools, and if the changes in the grant
system made the system more or less generous. A government committee that undertook to explore
this issue reached no ﬁrm conclusions.[19]
7compulsory educational system. They must also be open to all children. Thus, they
may not base admission on ability or on religious or ethnic origin. Finally, they are
not allowed to charge tuition. Among the approved schools are schools owned by
teacher or parent cooperatives, non-proﬁt organizations and privately owned ﬁrms.
The municipalities are allowed to give an opinion on whether they consider the es-
tablishment of an independent school to be harmful to existing schools, and their
views are taken into account by the National Agency for Education. However, the
municipalities have no veto, and are bound by law to ﬁnance an independent school
once it has been approved. On several occasions, the Agency has approved schools
against the will of the municipalities. While municipalities have no formal author-
ity to stop the establishment of independent schools, the attitude of the municipal
authorities is important in practice. As we will see below, such attitudes may aﬀect
the likelihood that an independent school is established.
The 1992 reform has had a drastic eﬀect on the number of independent schools.
In 1991/92, Sweden had 90 independent schools at the compulsory level, a number
which had increased to around 400 in the academic year 2001/02. The rapid growth
continues. The National Agency for Education has received 251 applications for the
academic year 2002/03. Over the past years, only about half of the approved schools
have actually started, but it is clear that the number of independent schools will
continue to increase. Still, the number of independent schools is small compared
to the total number of schools, which is about 5000. The number of students in
independent schools is a very small fraction of the total number of students, around
4 percent. However, this share is rapidly increasing, as the enrollment in independent
schools has grown by 10-12 percent a year in the past few years. Further, there is
also a considerable variation between diﬀerent municipalities. While around half
of Sweden’s municipalities have no independent schools, in several municipalities,
8around ten percent of the students or more attend independent schools, the largest
share being above 18 percent for the academic year 1999/2000.
While religious or ethnic origin may not be a requirement for admission, there is no
rule against denominational schools, or schools with a focus on speciﬁc ethnic groups.
Muslim and Jewish schools have been approved, as well as Christian schools of various
denominations. About 15 percent of the independent schools are denominational.
However, the majority are either ”general” schools (30 percent) or schools applying
some distinct pedagogical idea, such as Montessori, Waldorf, Freinet or Reggio Emilia
(30 percent). The remaining 25 percent are ethnic schools, schools with teaching in
another language than Swedish, or schools with a focus on some special subject, e.g.
artistic schools, etc. The largest number of independent schools are found in the
main urban areas, but several schools have also been started in rural areas. In fact,
some of the municipalities with the largest share of students in independent schools
are to be found in the sparsely populated northern part of Sweden.
Not surprisingly, this development has triggered a ﬁerce debate. While some mu-
nicipalities have embraced the reform, others see it as a threat to local democracy,
and view independent schools as a serious ﬁnancial burden. The governing social
democratic party is divided on the issue, with one fraction wanting to reverse the
reform, or at least allow municipalities the right to veto the establishment of inde-
pendent schools. The main concern of those opposing independent schools is that




The objective of this paper is to analyze how competition from independent schools
has aﬀected the quality of public schools. Thus, the dependent variable should be
some measure of student performance. We will discuss how this performance variable
is deﬁned below. The key explanatory variable should be a gauge of the degree of
competition from independent schools. As such a gauge, we use the share of students
attending independent schools on each ”market”. Each municipality is deﬁned as a
”market”, since students almost invariably attend schools in their own municipality.
If the municipal schools are considered to be a single ”ﬁrm”, this variable is in fact
one minus the 1-ﬁrm concentration ratio. It should be noted that this variable is not
calculated from our data. Instead, it is a ﬁgure for the independent school share in
the municipalities in the entire compulsory school system, i.e. grades 1 through 9.
We can formulate the ”main” equation in our analysis as:
yi = β1Si + Xiβ2 + εi (1)
where yi is a measure of student i:s performance in public schools, Si is the share
of students attending independent schools in the municipality where student i lives,
Xi is a vector of other explanatory variables, β1 and β2 are the parameters to be
estimated, and εi is an error term. The elements of vector Xi are characteristics
of the individual, the municipality and the school, which will be discussed further
below.
A central empirical challenge is to take account of the potential endogeneity of
Si, that is, the share of students attending independent schools. If public schools
10are of poor quality, the demand for alternatives is likely to increase. Failing to take
this into account may lead us to falsely conclude that there is no positive eﬀect of
competition, or indeed to ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of competition on the quality of public
schools.
There is an additional complication in the Swedish setting, making the sign of
the endogeneity bias ambiguous. Recall that independent schools are not allowed
to charge a tuition fee from students. Thus, the revenues of an independent school
are determined by the amount of funding they receive from the municipality. This
amount, in turn, is determined based on a calculation of the municipality’s average
costs for schooling. In addition, independent schools may not refuse to accept low
performing students. Since some such students, e.g. socially disadvantaged students,
or immigrant students with limited knowledge of Swedish, may give rise to additional
costs for the school, there are also some factors on the cost side that the individual
school might have diﬃculties in controlling. Thus, if there is a large number of
low ability students in a municipality, for which the independent schools are not
suﬃciently compensated, an independent school may not be viable.
In conclusion, our key explanatory variable, the share of students attending inde-
pendent schools, may be a function of our dependent variable, students’ educational
achievement. To solve the resulting identiﬁcation problem, we must ﬁnd some instru-
mental variables correlated with the share of students attending independent schools,
while they do not have an independent inﬂuence on students’ grades.
In essence, our approach for handling the endogeneity issue resembles that of
Hoxby [12] and Dee [3]. We begin by estimating an equation explaining the share
of students attending independent schools. These estimates are then used to con-
struct an instrument for this variable that can be used when estimating the eﬀects
of competition on student performance in public schools.
11We can formulate an equation explaining the share of independent schools in a
municipality in the following way:
Sj = Rjα + ξj (2)
where Sj is the share of students attending independent schools in municipality j,
Rj is a vector of explanatory variables, α a vector of parameters to be estimated,
and ξj is an error term. We use j as an index instead of i to emphasize that, unlike in
equation (1), the unit of observation is a municipality and not an individual. Since
this equation is a reduced form expression, Rj should include variables expected
to inﬂuence both the demand and the supply of education in independent schools.
Quite obviously, many of the elements of Rj in equation (2) will also appear in Xi in
equation (1). However, it is the fact that school quality in the municipality may be an
explanatory variable in this equation that is the source of the endogeneity problem.
In other words, endogeneity is caused by the fact that we would like to include the
municipality equivalence of yi, the dependent variable in equation (1), e.g. average
grades in the municipality, as an element in the vector Rj.
While Hoxby [12] and Dee [3] use religious variables as instruments for the share
of independent schools, this is not likely to work in the Swedish setting, and prob-
ably not in most other European countries either. The religious map of the US
reﬂects the changing patterns of immigration, the expansion of settlements over the
continent, and the constitutional ban of any established religion. As a consequence,
most regions have a religiously mixed population, and the share of diﬀerent religions
varies across regions. In Europe, by contrast, the principle of ”cuius regio, eius re-
ligio”, i.e. the principle that the Prince decided the religion of the people, and the
historical lack of religious freedom have given most regions a relatively homogenous
12religious composition. Religious minorities, whether historical or the result of recent
immigration, are often culturally distinct, and diﬀer from the majority population
in many respects with regard to both observable and non-observable socioeconomic
characteristics.
Sweden is particularly homogenous. Around 85 percent of the population are
members of the Lutheran Church of Sweden, which was not disestablished until the
year 2000. The cumulative membership of the ﬁve largest other Christian congre-
gations accounts for less than ﬁve percent of the population. ”Guesstimates” of the
number of Muslims range from one to above three percent of the population. The
Muslim minority is almost entirely the result of immigration during the last three
decades. The number of Jews is only 17000, accounting for 0.2 percent of the pop-
ulation. An additional reason why religious variables are unlikely to serve well as
instruments is that only a minority of the independents schools, around 15 percent,
are denominational.
The rationale for our approach is that the attitude of the municipalities towards
independent schools will inﬂuence the likelihood of such schools being established.
As discussed above, while the municipalities cannot veto the establishment of inde-
pendent schools, the National Agency for Education asks for their opinion. There are
also informal ways in which a municipality may aid or hinder the establishment of an
independent school, e.g. by delaying the necessary permits for the use of buildings
by a school. Some municipalities also go out of their way to inform parents about
independent as well as municipal schools, while others in eﬀect try to discourage
parents from choosing independent schools.
Naturally, it is hard to directly measure this ”attitude”. However, we may use
the municipalities’ policies in areas other than schooling as a proxy. In particular, it
seems likely that the extent to which municipalities contract out their responsibilities
13is an indicator of their attitude to the ”privatization” of public sector activities.
While some Swedish municipalities perform virtually all their tasks in-house, many
have contracted out their responsibilities to a considerable extent. At the same
time, the extent to which non-school activities are contracted out should not have
any independent eﬀect on the educational achievements of school children in the
municipality. We use data on the share of municipal activities contracted out in ﬁve
areas: ”infrastructure”, i.e. road-maintenance etc., child care, care for the elderly
and disabled, social services, i.e. treatment of drug addicts, aid to dysfunctional
families, etc., and ﬁnally, ”business activities”.
Since the reforms of school ﬁnancing came into force in 1992, it seems safe to
assume that the grades given in that year have not been aﬀected by any change
in the degree of competition from independent schools. Thus, it should be safe to
include the average grades in the municipalities for the year 1992, which is the ﬁrst
year for which data are available, as an explanatory variable in equation (2).
Other explanatory variables in equation (2) are the share of immigrants, the share
of the population with no higher education, and a measure of average income in the
municipality, all of which may aﬀect the demand for independent schools. We would
expect the ﬁrst of these to have a positive eﬀect on the share of students attending
independent schools, since some independent schools have a special focus on minority
groups. Parents with a higher level of education and a higher income are more likely
to make an active choice of school for their children, which should tend to increase
the likelihood that they attend an independent school. Thus, we would expect the
second of these variables to have a negative sign, and the third to have a positive
sign.
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is situated
in a major urban area, and a measure of the population density. As such a measure,
14we use ”population distance”, which is calculated by Statistics Sweden, and which is a
measure of the hypothetical average distance between inhabitants in the municipality
under the assumption that they are evenly distributed. Thus, the value of this
variable is higher, the more sparsely populated is the municipality. It is not entirely
obvious what signs these variables should have. On the one hand, it may be easier
to start an independent school in a densely populated area. On the other hand, the
demand for an independent school may be greater if the closest public school is far
away. In fact, some independent schools have been started as a direct result of the
closing of rural schools.
In addition to the policy variables discussed above, we include a variable supposed
to measure the resources the municipality devotes to schooling - the average cost per
student. Strictly, this variable may also be endogenous, but we will ignore this
complication. It is unclear what sign it should have in a reduced form equation
such as (2). Conceivably, the demand for independent schools could be lower if the
municipal spending on schools is high. On the other hand, it may be easier to start
an independent school when the ﬁnancial conditions are advantageous.
Finally, two political variables are included in equation (2), namely the share of
votes received by the non-socialist parties in the last general election, in 1998, and a
variable indicating if the municipal government is non-socialistic. The rationale for
including these two variables is that it seems likely that the political views of the
inhabitants of a municipality should aﬀect the demand for independent schools. Since
the main opposition to independent schools originates from the left on the political
spectrum, we would expect the demand for alternatives to the public school system
to be larger, the larger is the non-socialist share of the electorate.
The share of students attending independent schools cannot be less than zero,
but is, in fact, zero in several municipalities. To take this into account, equation (2)
15is estimated as a Tobit model.
In essence, the endogeneity of the share of students in independent schools is
caused by the fact that independent schools are not established by chance. However,
given the size and number of independent schools, self-selection remains a problem,
since students are not randomly distributed between independent and public schools.
Rather, this distribution is determined by the preference for independent schools. If
this preference is related to the students’ aptitude, we do not accounting for the
fact that self-selection may lead to erroneous conclusions. If, for instance, more able
students have a higher propensity to select independent schools, we may fail to ﬁnd
an eﬀect of competition on student results in public schools, or even ﬁnd an adverse
eﬀect.
We address this problem by using Heckman’s approach. In other words, we treat
yi of equation (1) as a latent variable that is only observed if the student chooses to
go to a public school. We may formulate a selection equation as:
wi = Ziγ + ζi (3)
where Zi is a vector of explanatory variables, γ is a parameter vector and ζi is an
error term. The latent variable yi of equation (1) is thus only observed if wi > 0.T h e
dependent variable in this model, wi, may be viewed as the individual’s preference
for municipal schooling. Note that wi is also a latent variable. What we observe is






1 if wi > 0
0 if wi ≤ 0
(4)
where w∗
i =1implies that the student attends a municipal school.
Our model can be summarized by equations (1), (2) and (3). While it may be of
16interest to analyze why independent schools are established in some municipalities
but not in others, our main reason for estimating equation (2) is to construct an
instrument for the key variable in equation (1), which is our ”main equation”.
We use a few diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the main equation. In all of these, the
explanatory variables are the same. However, we use ﬁve diﬀerent achievement vari-
ables as the dependent variable. Measuring educational achievement is diﬃcult.
Obviously, we would like a measure that is as encompassing as possible. With this
criterion, the ”credit value” seems ideal. This value is calculated from the student’s
ﬁnal grades in his 16 ”best” subjects, and constitutes the basis for acceptance to
high school. Thus, this value is roughly equivalent to a grade point average. On
the other hand, there is a risk that this measure is not objective since, by necessity,
it involves the subjective judgements of teachers. In particular, a possible eﬀect of
competition between schools may be to induce teachers to be more generous when
grading students. The most objective measure we were able to ﬁnd was the results
on two of the ﬁve sub-test in the achievement test in mathematics, sub-tests A and
B. Sub-test A tests the students’ ability to comprehend mathematical symbols and
expressions while sub-test B consists of short algebraic problems. This should limit
the scope for subjectivity as far as possible.5
The use of our two other achievement variables is motivated by a diﬀerent concern.
It is conceivable that competition increases the average performance but still hurts
low-ability students. To explore this possibility, one dichotomous variable indicating
5Another advantage of using sub-tests A and B is that we have access to the exact scores of each
student, thus giving us an approximately continuous dependent variable. (The maximum scores
are 30 and 45, respectively.) For the three other mathematics sub-tests, only the grades, on a
four-step scale, are reported. As an informal robustness test, we ran ordered probit regressions on
the three other sub-tests, ignoring self selection and endogeneity. Using the robust standard errors,
the competition variable was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5-percent level in all cases but
one, the oral part of the mathematics test. We also ran ordered probit regressions on grades in
mathematics, Swedish and English, again ignoring self selection and endogeneity. This time, the
competition variable is signiﬁcant for the maths grade, but not for the English and Swedish grades.
In all cases, the coeﬃcient estimates are positive, however. The results are not reported but can be
obtained from the corresponding author.
17if the student obtained passing grades in all of the three cardinal subjects (mathemat-
ics, Swedish and English),6 and one variable indicating if he obtained passing grades
in all subjects, were used. In these regressions, the econometric speciﬁcation must
be changed since we do not observe yi of equation (1). The models are estimated as
a bivariate probit model with partial observability of one of the variables. Instead of






1 if yi > 0
0 if yi ≤ 0
. (5)
Thus, y∗
i =1implies that the student passes all his classes. However, we only observe
y∗
i if w∗
i =1 , i.e. if he attends a municipal school.
As discussed above, our key explanatory variable in the main equation is the
share of students attending independent schools, which is supposed to be a measure
of the degree of competition faced by municipal schools. However, since students
are also allowed to choose between diﬀerent municipal schools, a certain amount
of competition will also exist between these. This is hard to measure but, ceteris
paribus, the competition between schools, municipal or independent, will be tenser
the closer these are located, since students are less likely to make an active choice
between schools if the distance between the closest and the second closest school is
large. As a proxy for this factor, we use the population distance variable, and a
dummy variable indicating if the municipality is located in a major urban area. As
we will see below, however, it is diﬃcult to draw any inference from the coeﬃcients
of these variables since they will be included in all three equations. These two
demographic variables may also capture other factors that aﬀect school choice, the
presence of independent schools and student ability. However, no better proxy was
available.
6A student cannot enter high school until he has passed these three subjects.
18The other background variables included in the main equation are sex (female=1),
immigrant background, parents’ educational level, average municipal income, the
municipality’s educational spending per child, and the number of students at the
school. The ﬁrst four are included to account for factors likely to inﬂuence the
students’ ability. Obviously, it would be preferable to have access to family income,
instead of a municipal average. However, no such data were available. The school
spending variable excludes rental costs, since this is diﬃcult to deﬁne due to varying
accounting practices among municipalities, and because the cost of renting a school
building is unlikely to have any eﬀect on educational results. The number of students
at the school was included because this has been found to be important in some
Swedish studies of student achievements. [18]
Some variables included in the selection equation also ﬁgure in the main equation.
Those are the variables for sex, immigrant background, parents’ educational back-
ground, average income in the municipality, population distance, the dummy variable
for major urban area and the municipality’s educational spending per child. In addi-
t i o n ,w ei n c l u d et h ev o t es h a r eo ft h en o n - s o c i a listic parties in the last general election
(1998) and a dummy variable indicating if the municipality has a non-socialist gov-
erning majority. It could be expected that the propensity to vote for a non-socialistic
party is correlated with the propensity to put your child in an independent school.
It is likely that the error terms are more closely correlated for individuals attend-
ing the same school than for individuals in diﬀerent schools. To allow for this, we
estimate robust standard errors, allowing for a cluster eﬀect, using the procedure
suggested by Rogers [16].
193.2 Data
The empirical analysis uses four sets of data. One of these is used for the panel data
analysis, and is further discussed in section (3.4). The three other data sets are, ﬁrst,
data on around 28 000 youths, second, data on public and independent schools, and
third, data on municipalities.
The data on individuals have been assembled by the National Agency for Ed-
ucation and consist of socioeconomic variables, grades and results on the national
achievement tests, for all students in the ninth grade in 34 Swedish municipalities
for the scholastic year 1997/98. The grades are reported both as a ”credit value”,
which is a summary measure of all grades, roughly equivalent to a grade point aver-
age, and as grades in individual subjects. The national achievement tests are given
in the subjects English, Swedish and mathematics. The students’ grades on each
sub-test, as well as on the test as a whole, are reported. For some of the sub-tests,
the exact scores are reported, thus providing even more detailed information. The
socioeconomic variables include the parents’ educational level, the student’s sex and
information on whether he or either of his parents is an immigrant. Parts of this
data set have been provided to the NationalA g e n c yf o rE d u c a t i o nf r o mS t a t i s t i c s
Sweden. This is the case for all data on grades, such as credit value, and most of the
socioeconomic background data. Data on test results, however, have been collected
by the Agency from schools in the municipalities included in the sample. Unfortu-
nately, there is a considerable number of missing observations in this part of the data
set, as will be discussed further below. Since the variable for the student’s sex has
also been assembled from the test data base, there is also a large number of missing
observations for this variable.
The school data base contains variables indicating the type of school, the number
20of students, etc. The data on municipalities, ﬁnally, provide information on popula-
tion distance, a measure of average income, the municipality’s costs for the compul-
sory school per student and an indicator of whether the municipality is situated in a
major urban area. Naturally, a key variable is the share of students attending inde-
pendent schools. Then, we also have information on a number of political variables.
We have data on voting behavior in the 1998 election, the political aﬃliation of the
municipal government and a few policy variables dealing with the degree to which
municipal responsibilities have been contracted out. Data on schools were provided
by the National Agency for Education while the municipal data are from Statistics
Sweden.
/Table 1 about here./
The full data set covers 29335 students in 34 Swedish municipalities. After ex-
cluding students attending some ”odd” schools, such as hospital schools and a few
schools run by the national government or regional governments, the data set consists
of 28065 students, 26656 of which attend municipal schools. Descriptive statistics for
these are presented in table 1.
The school data base lacks data on one municipality, leaving us with a sample
of 33 municipalities and 27996 students, 26587 of which attend municipal schools.
As can be seen in Table 1, only a few observations are lacking in the data dealing
with the students’ grades (credit value, no failing cardinal subject and no failing
grade), while almost 13 percent of the observations lack information on test results
from sub-test B, and almost as many for sub-test A. It is not likely that the missing
observations are random. In fact, the average credit value for the observations missing
information on test results is 146, while the mean over all observations is 199. The
situation is complicated by the fact that we also miss observations on the students’
sex for observations lacking information on test results. Since sex is included as an
21explanatory variable in all regressions, these observations will have to be omitted in
all regressions. Thus, it is essential that we test if our results are robust to diﬀerent
assumptions about the missing observations.
/Table 2 about here/
Equation (2) is estimated using data on all Swedish municipalities. Descriptive
statistics for the variables included in that regression are presented in Table 2. In
1998, Sweden had 288 municipalities.7 Missing observations are not completely over-
lapping, leaving us with a sample of 280, 177 of which had at least one independent
school in 1998. The data on grades are from the year 1992, the year the reforms were
instituted. Thus, it seems reasonable that these grades have not been aﬀected by the
presence of independent schools. In 1992, grades were given on a ﬁve grade scale.
The numbers in the table represent averages for all students in each municipality. In
Table 3, the correlation between the share of students in independent schools and
the ﬁve variables describing the degree to which municipal responsibilities have been
contracted out is presented. This correlation is positive, and in some cases highly so,
between the independent school share and the contracting-out variables.
/Table 3 about here/
3.3 Results
The result from a Tobit estimation of equation (2) is presented in Table 4. Only one
of the coeﬃcients of the contracting-out variables, child care, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at any usual level of signiﬁcance. The variables on the immigrant share and
the share of the population without higher education are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. In the ﬁrst case, the sign is positive and in the second case, it is negative,
thus indicating that immigrants and people with higher education have a positive
7In 1999, one municipality was split into two. Thus, Sweden now has 289 municipalities.
22eﬀect on the number of students attending independent schools. The coeﬃcient on the
vote share of the non-socialist parties is also positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, which conﬁrms our suspicion that voting behavior will inﬂuence the likelihood
that a student attends an independent school. However, the political aﬃliation of
the municipal government has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. The urban dummy is signiﬁcant
with a positive sign, which is not surprising, since most independent schools are
established in the main urban areas in Sweden.
The most interesting result from this regression is perhaps that the coeﬃcient on
average grades in 1992 is negative, and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The share of
students attending independent schools thus seems to be larger where school quality
is low. This is in line with Hoxby’s [12] results, and indicates that we run the risk
of underestimating any positive eﬀects of competition if we do not take endogeneity
into account. Our results give no support to the hypothesis that independent schools
are more likely to be established in municipalities with ”easy customers”, i.e. few
low-ability students.
/Table 4 about here./
F o re a c ho fo u rﬁve result measures, we use four diﬀerent econometric speciﬁca-
tions for the ”main” equation, i.e. equation (1). Estimations (I) and (II) in each
of the tables ignore self-selection, whilem o d e l s( I I I )a n d( I V )a r ee s t i m a t e du s i n g
Heckman’s approach, with equation (3) forming the selection part of the model. In
the two cases where the dependent variable is dichotomous, the resulting equation is
formulated as a probit. Equations (II) and (IV) are estimated using an instrument for
the share of students attending independent schools. This instrument is constructed
using the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. In all cases, the presented
standard errors are from robust estimators allowing for clustering.
We will ﬁrst discuss which speciﬁcation should be our preferred model. For each
23set of four speciﬁcations, we would ﬁrst like to test the hypothesis that the ”critical
variable”, i.e. the share of students attending independent schools is in fact exoge-
nous against the alternative hypothesis that this variable is endogenous, and second,
the hypothesis that equations (1) and (3) are independent, against the hypothesis
that they are not. For the ﬁrst of these, we used a Hausman test. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, we could not in any case reject the hypothesis that the share of students
attending independent schools is exogenous at any reasonable level of signiﬁcance.
Based on these tests, we should thus prefer the non-IV speciﬁcations. The hypothe-
sis that equations (1) and (3) are independent was then only tested for the non-IV
speciﬁcations, and could at least be rejected at the 5-percent level for the three con-
tinuous variables, but not at any usual level of signiﬁcance for the two dichotomous
variables.
In our analysis of the results, we will thus focus on the Heckman models (III) for
the continuous variables, and on the univariate probit models (I) for the dichotomous
variables. However, the results are similar in all econometric speciﬁcations.
We should be cautious in interpreting the results for two of our school result
variables, scores on sub-test A, and the dummy variable indicating if the student has
no failing grades. (The estimation results for these two variables are deferred to the
appendix.) The reasons for this are the following. In the Heckman model with sub-
test A as the dependent variable, the estimate for ρ, i.e. the coeﬃcient of correlation
between the error terms in the selection equation is -1, which is at the lower bound
for that coeﬃcient. Most likely, this indicates that the model is misspeciﬁed. In
fact, while the distribution of test scores for sub-test B is nicely bell-shaped, the
distribution of scores for sub-test A is markedly skewed to the right. As a measure
of achievement, our equation (1), the score on sub-test A is in eﬀect censored to
the right, thus violating the assumptions behind the Heckman model. This is the
24result of the design of the mathematics test, where sub-test A is mainly intended
to determine which students should get a passing grade, while the other sub-tests
are used to determine which of the passing grades a student should get. Thus, we
will largely ignore the regressions using sub-test A as the dependent variable, while
noting that these results support our conclusions.
The dummy variable indicating if the student has no failing grades was included
to test for the possibility that competition harms low ability students, something
that may be true even if the average student beneﬁts from competition. The other
dichotomous student results variable, which indicates if the student obtains passing
grades in the three cardinal subjects, was included for the same reason. However,
while the second of these two variables does indeed seem to identify low performing
students well, the former does not. A student who does not pass the cardinal subjects
cannot attend high school, while a student failing one or a few other subjects may
not even get a lower credit value. Recall that the credit value is calculated from the
student’s 16 highest grades. Thus, in order to get as high a credit value as possible,
some students may calculate that they will fail a subject and devote their energy to
subjects where they have a chance of receiving a higher grade. Casual empiricism8
suggests this to be a quite common behavior. While the average credit value of
students failing at least one class, but passing the three cardinal subjects, is below
average, it is clear that not all students with some failing grades in their report card
are under achievers. In fact, around one tenth of the students who fail at least one
subject, but pass all three cardinal subjects, has a credit value above the average. In
our discussion below of how low ability students are aﬀected by competition, we will
focus on the regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the
student passes the three cardinal subjects.
8Discussions with students and teachers.
25Estimation results for the three remaining achievement variables are presented in
tables 5-7. In all regressions, the coeﬃcient on the variable with the share of children
attending independent schools is positive. In the preferred econometric speciﬁcation
(model III) for the continuous dependent variables, it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the one-percent level. The results thus suggest that competition improves
the quality of public schooling. While the size of the coeﬃcient varies between the
diﬀerent econometric speciﬁc a t i o n s ,t h eq u a l i t a t i v er e s u l t sr e m a i nt h es a m e . T h e
coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all cases, including
sub-test A.
In the speciﬁcation with a dichotomous dependent variable, the results are less
clear. While the coeﬃcient is positive in all estimated models, it is signiﬁcant in only
one speciﬁcation, the instrumental variable probit (II). Since this is not our preferred
speciﬁcation, based on the tests performed, we should probably not attribute too
much importance to this result.9 Our failure to get any clear results in these speciﬁ-
cations could either be due to the fact that low-ability students beneﬁtl e s sf r o mt h e
increase in quality due to increased competition than the average student, or simply
be a result of the lower amount of information contained in a dichotomous variable,
as compared to a continuous result variable. However, the main point is that there is
no evidence that low-achievers are adversely aﬀected by increased competition from
independent schools.
/Table 5-7 about here./
It is comforting to note that in all cases, the instrumental variable estimates are
larger in magnitude than the comparable non-IV estimate. Thus, we are likely to err
on the side of caution in claiming to ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of competition.
9In addition, this result is not robust to slight alterations of the model, such as minor changes
in the list of explanatory variables. The coeﬃcient is still positive, but not signiﬁcant, if we exclude
the population distance variable and the dummy for major urban areas.
26Our rejection of the OLS model against the Heckman speciﬁcation, and the fact
that the estimated coeﬃcients in the latter are larger in magnitude, implies that we
are likely to underestimate the positive eﬀects of competition if ignoring self-selection.
The estimation results on the other coeﬃcients oﬀer few surprises. Girls have
signiﬁcantly better school results than boys (except for the test scores on sub-test
A, where boys score signiﬁcantly higher). A higher educational level of parents
has a positive inﬂuence on school achievements, while children with an immigrant
background have signiﬁcantly worse results. These coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant
in all cases, usually at the one-percent level. The coeﬃcient on the income variable
is positive, and signiﬁcant in one case (sub-test B).
For the two demographic variables, the dummy for a major urban area and the
population distance variable, only the latter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and
only when the dependent variable is continuous. These variables were included to
proxy for a possible eﬀect of competition between diﬀerent municipal schools. Our
hypothesis was that competition between diﬀerent municipal schools would be more
intense, ceteris paribus, the closer they were located. Since the population distance
variable is larger the more sparsely populated is the municipality, this variable should
have a negative sign to support our hypothesis. This is the opposite to our ﬁndings.
However, while we ﬁnd no evidence of a positive eﬀect of competition between munic-
ipal schools, concluding that such an eﬀect does not exist is probably premature. As
pointed out above, our demographic variables are probably poor proxies for ”intra-
municipal” competition, and may also be correlated with unobserved factors that are
important for school choice and educational achievement.10
10One point of criticism of our results has focused on the inclusion of these two demographic
variables. To test if our results are robust to speciﬁcation with regard to these two variables, we
tested to exclude them, to include the logarithm or the square of the population density variable,
and all combinations thereof. In all regressions, the qualitative results were the same as in the main
regressions. For the credit value and sub-test B, the changes in the estimated coeﬃcients were in
the second signiﬁcant digit. (Results available from the corresponding author.)
27The school-cost variable is not signiﬁcant, and the sign is sometimes negative.
While this result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Hanushek [8] and others that the
link is weak, if not nonexistent, between resources spent on education, and educa-
tional outcome, we would not like to draw any conclusions from this result. Since
this is not the focus of the study, we have not taken the potential endogeneity of this
variable into account.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the number of students attending ninth grade in
the school is positive, and signiﬁcant in two cases. (Credit value and the no failing
grade in the cardinal subject variable.) Thus, we ﬁnd weak evidence that students
in larger schools achieve better results.
In the selection equation, we ﬁnd that ﬁve coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for both
the credit value and sub-test B. The results are quantitatively the same as in an
ordinary probit estimation of the likelihood that a student will attend a municipal
school. Immigrant background and parents with a higher educational background
reduce the probability that a student will attend a municipal school. Population
distance is also negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that people in sparsely populated
areas are more likely to attend an independent school.
The two ”political variables” are both signiﬁcant, with opposite signs. Taken at
face value, a larger vote-share for the non-socialist parties increases the likelihood
of a student attending an independent school. However, given this vote-share, this
probability is reduced if the municipality has a non-socialist governing majority. This
may seem surprising, but a reasonable hypothesis is that the need to opt out of the
public school system may be reduced if the governing majority is of the same political
aﬃliation as the parent. The estimation results are consistent with the estimates of
equation (2).11
11The population distance variable has opposite eﬀects in the selection equation and in equation
28The robustness of our results may mainly be challenged for two reasons. First,
there is a large number of missing data, and second, data are only from a selection
of Swedish municipalities.
To address the last of these issues, we tested to drop each municipality, one at
a time, two at a time, and three at a time, for all possible combinations of the
33 municipalities, using credit value and sub-test B as dependent variables. We
estimated the models using the preferred Heckman speciﬁcation. When only one
municipality was dropped, the coeﬃcient on the independent school share remained
positive and signiﬁcant in all cases when we used the Heckman speciﬁcation, in all
cases but two at the 1- or 5-percent level.12 When two municipalities were dropped,
the estimated coeﬃcient failed to be signiﬁcant in 9 cases out of the 528 possible
combinations, when sub-test B is the dependent variable, and in 13 cases when the
credit value is the dependent variable. However, in no case did the estimates fail to
be signiﬁcant for both sub-test B and the credit value for the same combination of
dropped municipalities. In most cases where the Heckman estimates did not result
in a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the coeﬃcients were positive and
signiﬁcant when the models were estimated using OLS. (In all cases for sub-test B,
and in all but 5 cases for the credit value.)
When three municipalities were dropped, we got 5456 diﬀerent possible combina-
tions. In all but six, the coeﬃcient on the independent school share is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at least at the 10-percent level, for at least one of the two depen-
dent variables. It failed to be signiﬁcant for one of the variables in 493 cases. (173
and 326 for sub-test B and the credit value, respectively.) Even though the coeﬃcient
(2), but is only signiﬁcant in the former.
12In the Heckman estimation with the credit value as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level when Gothenburg or Uppsala was dropped. We also estimated
an OLS for comparison. In the OLS, the parameter estimate is signiﬁcant in all but one case for
sub-test B, and in all but six cases for the credit value.
29is negative in a few cases, it is not negative and signiﬁcant in one single case when
we use Heckman’s method, and in exactly one case when using OLS. In most cases,
the change in the parameter estimates is in the second signiﬁcant digit.
To test whether the large number of missing observations for test results, and
for the dummy variable for the student’s sex, has any serious consequences for our
results, we replaced the missing values under a few diﬀerent assumptions. First, the
sex-dummy was replaced by 0.5 which is close to the average in the sample, as is
hardly surprising. We then replaced the missing values for the credit value and the
student’s grade in mathematics with zero. We thus made the assumption that all
students for which data were missing were extreme low ability students. Finally, we
regressed the test results from sub-tests A and B, respectively, on the credit value
and the mathematics grade, and also on each of these separately, and replaced the
missing values for these tests with the predicted values. The values of the coeﬃcients
fell slightly, between 7 and 12 % for sub-test B, and between 11 and 18 % for sub-
test A, but were still signiﬁcant at the 5- and 1-percent level, respectively. As an
additional test, we replaced all missing data for the test scores and for the credit
value with zero, and ran the regressions on these three variables. This assumption is
clearly extreme, since many students with missing data on the test scores have above
average grades in mathematics. However, under this assumption, the coeﬃcients
in the regressions with sub-test A and the credit value as dependent variables are
smaller in value, about half the size for sub-test A, and 13 % for the credit value,
but were still signiﬁcant at the 1- and 5-percent levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
For sub-test B, the value of the coeﬃcient is higher, but the estimate is no longer
signiﬁcant.13
13We also tested various other assumptions about the missing values for the sex and parental
education variables: That all missing are boys/girls, that all missing have only the low-
est/intermediate/highest level of education. None of these permutations of the model aﬀected
30Our conclusion is that the results are robust with regard to changes in the selection
of municipalities in the sample. Only under extreme assumptions about the missing
values do the qualitative results change. Thus, our results also seem to be robust in
this respect.
3.4 Panel data analysis
In the three regressions described above, we allow for the error terms to be more
closely correlated within observational units (schools) than across such units. In
eﬀect, we assume an error component model. An alternative speciﬁcation would be
to use a panel data setting. However, since our data on individuals are from one
time period only, the estimation of ﬁxed eﬀect models is not tractable. To check if
non-observable heterogeneity is important in accounting for student results, we use
a separate data set on municipal grade averages and background variables. Data are
available for the years 1992 and 1994-1997 for all 288 municipalities that existed in
1997. Since two of these were created in 1995 through some changes of administrative
boundaries, the panel is unbalanced.
We estimate one-way and two-way models, using both ﬁxed eﬀects and a random
eﬀects speciﬁcation. In table 2, we also present estimation results from an OLS and
a between model. Since this data base contains aggregate data, the variables are
slightly diﬀerent from the three previous models. It should also be noted that the
dependent variable is an average for all students, i.e. for students in both municipal
and independent schools. The variable indicating the share of students in independent
schools is the same as before, however. Apart from this variable, we include variables
for the shares of the population with immigrant background and with no higher
education. In addition, the municipality’s spending on education, excluding rental
our conclusions.
31costs, are included. This variable is also deﬁned as before.
/T a b l e2a b o u th e r e . /
The preferred model is the two-way random eﬀects model. In the two-way set-
ting, we cannot reject the random eﬀects model against the ﬁxed eﬀects model on the
ﬁve percent level in a Hausman-test, while we may reject the one-way speciﬁcation
against the two-way speciﬁcation. However, the coeﬃcients on the variable for the
independent school share are close in all regressions, and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁ-
cations except the two-way ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and the between model. The
results from the panel data models thus conﬁrm earlier results, and seem to validate
the error component setting assumed in the sample selection models.
Since the panel data models are speciﬁed as simple linear models, the coeﬃcients
are easily interpreted. To get a idea of the economic signiﬁcance of increased com-
p e t i t i o n ,w em a yc o m p a r et h e” r e s o u r c ec o e ﬃcient”, i.e. educational spending per
student, with the impact of a larger percentage of students in independent schools.
Such an analysis must obviously be taken with several grains of salt, but gives some
idea of the scale of the eﬀect. Taken literally, the preferred model implies that an
increase in the share of students attending independent schools by one percentage
point would be equivalent to an increase in spending by about SEK 2000,14 which
corresponds to an increase in spending by over 5 percent, computed from the sample
average.
4 Concluding remarks
The role of independent schools had been hotly debated long before Friedman and
Friedman [6] proposed school vouchers as a means of improving the quality of school-
ing. In the Netherlands, the ”schoolstrijd”, in which advocates and opponents of
14SEK 1 ≈ EUR 0.11 ≈ USD 0.097, as of March 2002.
32state support to independent schools clashed, was a central issue of political conﬂict
during several decades around the turn of the century, leading up to the constitu-
tional compromise of 1917. [13] In France, the role of Catholic schools was a highly
divisive issue from the revolution of 1789 and onwards. [4] The establishment of secu-
lar schools was a central element of the anticlerical reforms under the Third Republic.
[1] In recent years, this debate has taken a new turn. Historically, much of the de-
bate has focused on ideological issues, e.g. whether it is right to use public funds to
support religious schools, or if public schools should be used as a means of imposing
greater national cohesion. In today’s debate, however, eﬃciency motives have been
introduced as an argument for school choice. It is claimed that increased competition
b e t w e e ns c h o o l sw o u l db eb e n e ﬁcial to educational quality.
A number of empirical studies have shown this argument to be valid. The present
study conﬁrms the ﬁnding that greater competition improves the standards of public
schools. The wide scope of reform of the system for ﬁnancing primary education
makes the Swedish experience particularly interesting. Sweden has left a system
with virtually no parental inﬂuence over school choice, and an almost complete dom-
inance of public schools. A voucher system, where parents are allowed to choose any
school approved by the National Agency for Education, has been put in its place.
Independent schools receive funding on close to equal terms with public (municipal)
schools.
A widespread concern among opponents of school choice is that competition will
hurt the public schools. The present study shows this fear to be without foundation.
References
[1] ”anticlericalism” Encyclopædia Britannica <http://www.britannica.com/bcom/
eb/article/6/0,5716,7916+1,00.html>[Accessed 30 January 2001.]
33[2] Couch, Jim F., William F. Shughart II and Al L. Williams (1993) ”Private school
enrollment and public school performance.” Public Choice 76:301-312.
[3] Dee, T. S., (1998) ”Competition and the quality of public schools.” Economics of
Education Review 17:4:419-427.
[4] ”education, history of, France” Encyclopædia Britannica
<http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/5/0,5716,108335+18+
105951,00.html>[Accessed 30 January 2001.]
[5] Epple, Dennis, Richard E. Romano (1998) ”Competition between private and
public schools, vouchers, and peer-group Eﬀects” American Economic Review,
88(1):33-62.
[6] Friedman, M. and R.D. Friedman (1981) Free to choose: A personal statement.
New York: Avon Books.
[7] Greene, Jay P., Paul E. Peterson and Jiangtao Du (1999) ”Eﬀectiveness of school
choice.” Education and Urban Society 31:2:190-213.
[8] Hanushek, Eric A. (1986) ”The economics of schooling: production and eﬃciency
in public schools.” Journal of Economic Literature, 24(Sept.):1141-1177.
[9] Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, Jacob M. Markman and Steven G. Rivkin
(2001) ”Does peer ability aﬀect student achievement?” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper, no. 8502, Washington, D.C.: NBER.
[10] Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2001) ”Peer eﬀects in the classroom: Learning from gen-
der and race variation.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper,
no. 7867, Washington, D.C.: NBER.
[11] Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2000) ”Does competition among public schools beneﬁt
students and taxpayers?” American Economic Review. 90:5:1209-1238.
[12] Hoxby, Caroline Minter (1994) ”Do private schools provide competition for pub-
lic schools?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 4978,
34Washington, D.C.: NBER.
[13] ”Netherlands, The. The Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814-1818).” En-
cyclopædia Britannica <http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/2/
0,5716,115642+18+108757,00.html>[Accessed: 29 January 2001.]
[14] Newmark, Craig M. (1995) ”Another look at whether private schools inﬂuence
public school quality: Comment” Public Choice 82:367-373.
[15] Rapp, Geoﬀrey C. (2000) ”Agency and choice in education: Does school choice
enhance the work eﬀort of teachers?” Education Economics 8:1:37-63.
[16] Rogers, W.H. (1993) ”Regression standard errors in clustered samples.” Stata
Technical Bulletin Reprints. 3:88-94.
[17] Rouse, Cecilia Elena (1998) ”Private school vouchers and student achievement:
An evaluation of the Milwaukee parental choice program” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113:2:553-602.
[18] Skolverket (National Agency for Education) (1998) Sambandet mellan resurser
och resultat. (The connection between resources and results.) Report no. 170, Dnr
97:573. Stockholm: Skolverket.
[19] SOU 1999:98. Likvärdiga villkor ( O ne q u a lt e r m s . )R e p o r tf r o mt h eG o v e r n m e n t
Committee on Funding to Independent Schools. Stockholm: Fritzes.
[20] Vedder, Richard, Joshua Hall (2000) ”Private school competition and public
school teacher salaries” Journal of Labor Research 21:1:161-68.
35 
      By municip.  By individual (all)  By individual (municipal school 
only) 
Variable  Min  Max  Valid 
obs. 
Mean  St. dev.  Valid 
obs. 
Mean  St. dev.  Valid 
obs. 
Mean  St. dev. 
Full sample      34      28065      26656     
Credit value  0  320        27456  199.1  65.24  26075  199.6  62.83 
Sub-test A  0  30        25000  19.95  6.934  23734  19.82  6.941 
Sub-test B  0  45        24543  21.57  9.266  23293  21.37  9.233 
No failing 
Coeur subj. 
0  1        26867  0.9167  0.2763  25726  0.9155  0.2782 
No failing 
grade 
0  1        27219  0.7799  0.4143  26075  0.7804  0.414 
Indep. school 
share 
0  10.2  33  2.412  3.108  27996  5.221  3.433  26587  5.079  3.431 
Woman  0  1        26079  0.4983  0.5000  24695  0.4969  0.5000 
Immigrant 
backgr. 
0  1        27111  0.2084  0.4062  25923  0.2048  0.4035 
Parents’ educ. 
backgr. 
1  3        26087  2.381  0.6696  24758  2.367  0.6715 
Income (muni. 
100 SEK) 
816.1  1197  33  952.1  90.34  27972  1013  100.9  26587  1010  100.4 
Urban dummy  0  1  33  0.2121  0.4151  27996  0.51075  0.4999  26587  0.4989  0.5000 
Population 
distance 
17  1077  33  222.6  224.5  27996  94.30  107.3  26587  96.46  108.5 
No. of students 
in school 
1  226  33  105.4  30.46  27972  116.5  41.72  26587  119.3  39.17 
School cost  34600  54900  33  42310  4791  27996  44420  5109  26587  44300  5091 
Non-socialist 
municip. gov. 
0  1  33  0.2121  0.4151  27996  0.08901  0.2848  26587  0.09253  0.2898 
Non-socialist 
vote share 
0.2359  0.5397  33  0.4040  0.08924  27996  0.4611  0.07012  26587  0.4592  0.07078 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics, variables in equations (1) and (3). 
For variables defined at the municipal level, descriptive statistics are presented both unweighted and weighted by the 
number of students in the sample from each municipality. For all variables, descriptive statistics are presented both for 
the entire sample, and for the sub-sample of students attending municipal schools.  
Variable  Min  Max  Valid obs.  Mean  St. dev. 
Indep. school share  0  14.6  288  1.610  3.108 
Average grades 92  2.98  3.51  285  3.194  0.08717 
Contracting (infrastructure)  0  50  288  7.830  9.369 
Contracting (child care)  0  29  288  5.257  5.129 
Contracting (elderly and 
disabled) 
0  84  288  8.396  9.196 
Contracting (social services)  0  55  288  17.17  10.45 
Contracting (business)  0  81  287  12.26  15.04 
School cost  29200  58900  284  41385  4601 
Share with immigr. backgr.  0  9  288  2.191  1.390 
Share without higher educ.  7  39  288  26.91  5.592 
Income (municip., 100s of 
SEK.) 
741  1755  288  956.2  121.4 
Non-socialist municip. gov. 
(dummy) 
0  1  288  0.3194  0.4671 
Non-socialist vote share  0.1897  0.8412  288  0.4367  0.1095 
Urban dummy  0  1  288  0.1319  0.3390 
Population distance  17  2045  288  276.4  267.1 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics, variables in equation (2) 
Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimating the model for the independent school share. Note that these data 
cover all of Sweden’s 288 municipalities.  
  Indep. sch. sh.  Cont.(infr.)  Contr.(chi.)  Contr.(eld.)  Contr.(soc.) 
Independent school share  -         
Contracting (infrastructure)  0.144  -       
Contracting (child care)  0.435  0.113  -     
Contracting (elderly and disabled)  0.385  0.138  0.384  -   
Contracting (social services)  0.129  0.074  0.083  0.208  - 
Contracting (business)  0.151  0.386  0.221  0.303  0.088 
 
Table 3 – Correlation between contracting out, and the independent school share 
The table displays the correlation between the degree to which municipalities have contracted out their responsibilities 
and the independent school share.  
Independent school share 
Valid obs:  280  
Left-censored obs:  103  
Uncensored obs:  177  
Average grades 92  -4.518 * 
  (2.443)  
Contracting (infrastructure)  0.02579  
  (0.01990)  
Contracting (child care)  0.1315 *** 
  (0.0428)  
Contracting (elderly and disabled)  -0.005913  
  (0.02513)  
Contracting (social services)  0.01101  
  (0.01814)  
Contracting (business)  -0.009423  
  (0.01248)  
School cost  3.73E-05  
  (4.74E-05)  
Share with immigr. backgr.  0.3868 *** 
  (0.1443)  
Share without higher educ.  -0.1338 *** 
  (0.04585)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  0.0003759  
  (0.00249)  
Non-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)  -0.6807  
  (0.5038)  
Non-socialist vote share  6.688 ** 
  (2.69)  
Urban dummy  1.764 ** 
  (0.6853)  
Population distance  -0.0007302  
  (0.001036)  
Constant  12.37  
  (8.187)  
Standard error:  2.610  
  (0.1451)  
Pseudo R2:  0.1184  
 
Table 4 – Explaining the share of independent schools 
The table presents results from a Tobit-estimation of equation (2), explaining the share of students attending 
independent schools in Sweden’s 288 municipalities.   Dependent variable : Credit value 
Main equation  I  II  III  IV 
Uncensored obs.  22961   22961   22961   22961  
Censored obs.  -   -   1098   1098  
Indep. school share  0.5381 *  1.493 **  1.461 ***  3.286 *** 
  (0.2849)   (0.6773)   (0.5379)   (0.9745)  
Woman  19.89 ***  19.90 ***  19.96 ***  19.99 *** 
  (0.9012)   (0.9018)   (0.9522)   (0.952)  
School cost  -0.0003269   -0.0003391   -0.0003355   -0.000317  
  (0.0002117)   (0.0002065)   (0.0003082)   (0.0002972)  
Immigrant backgr.  -7.098 ***  -7.311 ***  -4.134 **  -4.556 ** 
  (1.49)   (1.491)   (1.919)   (1.932)  
Parents’ educ. backgr.  29.18 ***  29.13 ***  31.15 ***  31.12 *** 
  (0.752)   (0.7424)   (0.9427)   (0.9461)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  0.009453   0.005358   0.01389   0.005293  
  (0.009754)   (0.01012)   (0.01587)   (0.01612)  
Urban dummy  1.839   0.4814   1.515   -0.7564  
  (2.410)   (2.709)   (3.735)   (4.073)  
Population distance  0.01434 *  0.02121 **  0.01434 *  0.02784 *** 
  (0.007834)   (0.008180)   (0.008355)   (0.009086)  
No. of students in school  0.04687 **  0.04262 **  0.04309 **  0.03277 * 
  (0.01833)   (0.01854)   (0.01691)   (0.01718)  
Constant  122.4 ***  124.0 ***  113.9 ***  116.1 *** 
  (10.69)   (10.73)   (16.59)   (16.60)  
Selection equation  Selected: Students attending municipal schools 
Woman        -0.1241 **  -0.1238 ** 
        (0.05266)   (0.05421)  
School cost        -0.0000338   -0.0000281  
        (0.0000285)   (0.0000246)  
Immigrant backgr.        -0.1549 **  -0.1555 ** 
        (0.07849)   (0.0775)  
Parents educ. backgr.        -0.3714 ***  -0.3692 *** 
        (0.04171)   (0.04101)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)        0.003311   0.002515  
        (0.002644)   (0.002206)  
Nod-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)        1.634 **  1.41 ** 
        (0.8273)   (0.6839)  
Non-socialist vote share        -9.899 *  -8.244 * 
        (5.537)   (4.503)  
Urban dummy        -0.1736   -0.1408  
        (0.2539)   (0.2272)  
Population distance        -0.001746 **  -0.001471 ** 
        (0.0008738)   (0.0007029)  
Constant        5.753 ***  5.467 *** 
        (1.268)   (1.144)  
r        -0.9534   -0.9525  
        (0.02689)   (0.02841)  
s        54.77   54.76  
        (0.7653)   (0.7624)  
l        -52.22   -52.16  
        (1.571)   (1.653)  
 
Table 5 – Explaining student results. Credit value. 
The table presents results from estimations of the main equation (1), with the credit value as the dependent 
variable. Estimations (I) and (II) ignore self-selection, while models (III) and (IV) are estimated using 
Heckman's approach, with equation (3) forming the selection part of the model. Equations (II) and (IV) are 
estimated using an instrument for the share of students attending independent schools. This instrument is 
constructed using the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. The presented standard errors are from 
robust estimators allowing for clustering. The preferred specification is model (III).   Dependent variable : Sub-test B 
Main equation  I  II  III  IV 
Uncensored obs.  21815   21815   21815   21815  
Censored obs.  -   -   1098   1098  
Indep. school share  0.1396 **  0.2795 **  0.1767 ***  0.2996 * 
  (0.05489)   (0.1335)   (0.05950)   (0.1582)  
Woman  0.393 ***  0.3971 ***  0.4020 ***  0.4001 *** 
  (0.1373)   (0.1375)   (0.1373)   (0.1371)  
School cost  0.0000107   0.0000148   0.0000105   0.0000152  
  (0.0000378)   (0.0000377)   (0.0000384)   (0.0000379)  
Immigrant backgr.  -3.185 ***  -3.214 ***  -3.087 ***  -3.187 *** 
  (0.2151)   (0.2196)   (0.2262)   (0.2399)  
Parents’ educ. backgr.  4.255 ***  4.252 ***  4.327 ***  4.273 *** 
  (0.1074)   (0.1081)   (0.1168)   (0.1403)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  0.004990 ***  0.00432 **  0.005129 ***  0.004313 ** 
  (0.001755)   (0.001824)   (0.001793)   (0.001832)  
Urban dummy  -0.7592   -0.9171 *  -0.7817   -0.9331 * 
  (0.4717)   (0.5413)   (0.4825)   (0.5523)  
Population distance  0.002197   0.003256 **  0.002235 *  0.003338 ** 
  (0.001381)   (0.001532)   (0.001351)   (0.001535)  
No. of students in school  0.003042   0.002333   0.003225   0.002328  
  (0.00359)   (0.003736)   (0.003573)   (0.003744)  
Constant  5.421 ***  5.482 ***  5.077 **  5.382 *** 
  (1.942)   (1.941)   (1.965)   (1.973)  
Selection equation  Selected: Students attending municipal schools 
Woman        -0.03646   -0.03386  
        (0.04310)   (0.04343)  
School cost        -0.0000504   -0.0000501  
        (0.0000384)   (0.0000386)  
Immigrant backgr.        -0.3142 ***  -0.3074 *** 
        (0.1010)   (0.1035)  
Parents educ. backgr.        -0.2731 ***  -0.2761 *** 
        (0.05880)   (0.05995)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)        0.005068   0.004989  
        (0.003114)   (0.003098)  
Non-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)        2.382 ***  2.355 *** 
        (0.8483)   (0.8439)  
Non-socialist vote share        -14.2 **  -14.1 ** 
        (5.948)   (5.936)  
Urban dummy        -0.2849   -0.2857  
        (0.3667)   (0.3684)  
Population distance        -0.00227 **  -0.002282 ** 
        (0.001066)   (0.001078)  
Constant        6.591 ***  6.617 *** 
        (1.65)   (1.676)  
r        -0.2252   -0.06626  
        (0.09317)   (0.2497)  
s        8.520   8.493  
        (0.06087)   (0.05504)  
l        -1.918   -0.5627  
        (0.8009)   (2.122)  
 
Table 6 – Explaining student results. Sub-test B. 
The table presents results from estimations of the main equation (1), with the scores on sub-test B as the 
dependent variable. Estimations (I) and (II) ignore self-selection, while models (III) and (IV) are estimated using 
Heckman's approach, with equation (3) forming the selection part of the model. Equations (II) and (IV) are 
estimated using an instrument for the share of students attending independent schools. This instrument is 
constructed using the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. The presented standard errors are from 
robust estimators allowing for clustering. The preferred specification is model (III).   Dependent variable : No failing grade in cardinal subjects 
Main equation  I  II  III  IV 
Uncensored obs.  22930   22930   22930   22930  
Censored obs.  -   -   1098   1098  
Indep. school share  0.01215   0.04745 **  0.0009692   0.04133  
  (0.008987)   (0.02228)   (0.01747)   (0.03595)  
Woman  0.1869 ***  0.1871 ***  0.1801 ***  0.1857 *** 
  (0.03039)   (0.03046)   (0.03194)   (0.03158)  
School cost  3.94e-06   2.42e-06   4.16e-06   2.36e-06  
  (7.42e-06)   (7.26e-06)   (7.47e-06)   (7.23e-06)  
Immigrant backgr.  -0.3174 ***  -0.3252 ***  -0.3360 ***  -0.3319 *** 
  (0.04857)   (0.04910)   (0.05175)   (0.05213)  
Parents’ educ. backgr.  0.5048 ***  0.5031 ***  0.4730 ***  0.4953 *** 
  (0.02345)   (0.02343)   (0.05592)   (0.04341)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  0.0002725   0.0001522   0.0002372   0.0001505  
  (0.0003551)   (0.0003583)   (0.000368)   (0.0003567)  
Urban dummy  -0.05760   -0.1140   -0.04966   -0.1078  
  (0.08134)   (0.08833)   (0.08157)   (0.09135)  
Population distance  0.0003766   0.0006337 **  0.0003703   0.0006094 ** 
  (0.0002554)   (0.000287)   (0.000254)   (0.0003082)  
No. of students in school  0.002437 ***  0.002303 ***  0.002359 ***  0.002305 *** 
  (0.0006161)   (0.0006209)   (0.0006131)   (0.0006195)  
Constant  -0.3800   -0.3100   -0.2739   -0.2774  
  (0.3768)   (0.3719)   (0.4288)   (0.4059)  
Selection equation  Selected: Students attending municipal schools 
Woman        -0.03000   -0.03286  
        (0.04178)   (0.04214)  
School cost        -0.0000461   -0.0000472  
        (0.0000385)   (0.0000385)  
Immigrant backgr.        -0.2931 ***  -0.2986 *** 
        (0.2931)   (0.1012)  
Parents educ. backgr.        -0.2840 ***  -0.2855 *** 
        (0.05942)   (0.05941)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)        0.004876   0.004909  
        (0.003106)   (0.003106)  
Non-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)        2.299 ***  2.324 *** 
        (0.8694)   (0.8562)  
Non-socialist vote share        -14.13 **  -14.09 ** 
        (5.941)   (5.949)  
Urban dummy        -0.3245   -0.3071  
        (0.376)   (0.3755)  
Population distance        -0.002393 **  -0.002346 ** 
        (0.001069)   (0.001069)  
Constant        6.641 ***  6.632 *** 
        (1.638)   (1.652)  
r        0.4157   0.1583  
        (0.4017)   (0.5854)  
 
Table 7 – Explaining student results. No failing grade in the cardinal subjects. 
The table presents results from estimations of the main equation (1), with a dummy variable indicating if the 
student has passing grades in the three cardinal subjects (mathematics, Swedish and English) as the dependent 
variable. Estimations (I) and (II) ignore self-selection and are estimated as probit models, since the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, while models (III) and (IV) are estimated as bivariate probit models with partial 
observability and with equation (3) forming the selection part of the model. Equations (II) and (IV) are estimated 
using an instrument for the share of students attending independent schools. This instrument is constructed using 
the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. The presented standard errors are from robust estimators 
allowing for clustering. The preferred specification is model (I).  
      One-way  Two-way     
  OLS    FE    RE    FE    RE    Between   
R2  0.2481    0.7515        0.7632        0.3305   
Adjusted R2  0.2460    0.6880        0.7015        0.3210   
Indep. school share  0.0041 
(0.0014) 
***  0.0037 
(0.0017) 
**  0.0041 
(0.0015) 
***  0.0019 
(0.0020) 
  0.0037 
(0.0016) 
**  0.0038 
(0.0028) 
 
Municip. school spending  2.1￿10-6 
(5.0￿10-7) 
***  3.4￿10-6 
(5.7￿10-7) 
***  2.8￿10-6 
(5.1￿10-7) 
***  1.4￿10-6 
(7.0￿10-7) 
**  1.6￿10-6 
(6.2￿10-7) 
***  1.9￿10-6 
(1.1￿10-6) 
** 
Share without higher educ.  -0.0064 
(3.7￿10-4) 
***  -0.0026 
(6.7￿10-4) 
***  -0.0046 
(4.8￿10-4) 
***  7.2￿10-4 
0.002 
  -0.0060 
(7.6￿10-4) 
***  -0.0070 
(7.2￿10-4) 
*** 
Share with immigr. backgr.  -0.0058 
(0.0015) 
***  -0.0085 
(0.0029) 
***  -0.0076 
(0.0021) 
***  -0.0013 
(0.0033) 
  -0.0033 
(0.0025) 
  -0.0051 
(0.0030) 
** 
Constant  3.3 
(0.024) 
***  N/A    3.2 
(0.028) 
***  3.1 
(0.078) 
***  3.3 
(0.035) 




Table 8 – Results from panel data models. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero 
at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels. The figures within parenthesis are standard errors. The one-way 
random effects model can be rejected against the fixed effects specification in a Hausman test at any 
usual level of significance. The two-way random effects specification cannot be rejected at the 5-
percent level against the fixed effects specification, however,. The models are estimated on data from 
all 288 Swedish municipalities for the years 1992 and 1994-1997. Appendix   Dependent variable : Sub-test A 
Main equation  I  II  III  IV 
Indep. school share  0.1266 ***  0.2512 ***  0.2031 **  0.2159 ** 
  (0.03907)   (0.09434)   (0.08219)   (0.09616)  
Woman  -1.199 ***  -1.196 ***  -1.113 ***  -1.202 *** 
  (0.1016)   (0.1018)   (0.1095)   (0.1018)  
School cost  0.0000213   0.0000253   0.0000216   0.0000248  
  (0.0000299)   (0.0000305)   (0.0000409)   (0.0000307)  
Immigrant backgr.  -1.901 ***  -1.927 ***  -1.427 ***  -1.974 *** 
  (0.1541)   (0.1603)   (0.2389)   (0.1616)  
Parents educ. backgr.  3.215 ***  3.212 ***  3.46 ***  3.176 *** 
  (0.08764)   (0.08765)   (0.1161)   (0.09384)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  0.002690 **  0.002092   0.003419   0.002101  
  (0.001332)   (0.001409)   (0.002137)   (0.001412)  
Urban dummy  -0.8369 **  -0.9781 **  -0.7541   -0.9495 ** 
  (0.3545)   (0.4066)   (0.4962)   (0.4077)  
Population distance  0.0001591   0.001111   -0.0005636   0.0009651  
  (0.00116)   (0.001256)   (0.001205)   (0.001273)  
No. of students in school  0.007740 ***  0.007112 **  5.96e-08   0.007142 ** 
  (0.002743)   (0.002886)   (1.19e-07)   (0.002865)  
Constant  8.448 ***  8.486 ***  8.151 ***  8.654 *** 
  (1.401)   (1.382)   (2.181)   (1.410)  
Selection equation  Selected: Students attending municipal schools 
Woman        0.1649 ***  -0.03225  
        (0.0167)   (0.0428)  
School cost        -0.0000138 **  -0.0000485  
        (5.80e-06)   (0.0000388)  
Immigrant backgr.        0.2113 ***  -0.3006 *** 
        (0.03633)   (0.1017)  
Parents educ. backgr.        -0.5123 ***  -0.2812 *** 
        (0.01521)   (0.06076)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)        0.001646 *  0.004941  
        (0.0009588)   (0.003110)  
Nod-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)        0.8313 **  2.333 *** 
        (0.3303)   (0.8490)  
Non-socialist vote share        -6.048 **  -14.21 ** 
        (2.403)   (5.993)  
Urban dummy        -0.1909 *  -0.3103  
        (0.1024)   (0.372)  
Population distance        -0.00105 **  -0.002381 ** 
        (0.0004972)   (0.001084)  
Constant        4.529 ***  6.689 *** 
        (0.4795)   (1.674)  
r        -1 ***  0.1545  
        (4.93e-12)   (0.09568)  
s        6.753   6.339  
        (0.1133)   (0.049)  
l        -6.753 ***  0.9797  
        (0.1133)   (0.6099)  
 
Table A1 – Explaining student results. Sub-test A. 
The table presents results from estimation of the main equation (1), with the scores on sub-test A as the 
dependent variable. Estimation (I) and (II) ignore self-selection, while models (III) and (IV) are estimated using 
Heckman's approach, with equation (3) forming the selection part of the model. Equations (II) and (IV) are 
estimated using an instrument for the share of students attending independent schools. This instrument is 
constructed using the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. The presented standard errors are from 
robust estimators allowing for clustering. The preferred specification is model (III). Not that the estimated value 
of r, i.e. the correlation between the random terms of the selection and main equations is –1, which is at the 
bound for that parameter. This indicates that the model may be miss-specified.   Dependent variable : No failing grade (all subjects) 
Main equation  I  II  III  IV 
Uncensored obs.  22961   22961   22961   22961  
Censored obs.  -   -   1098   1098  
Indep. school share  0.003633   0.007838   0.008454   0.01397  
  (0.008975)   (0.01906)   (0.01018)   (0.02183)  
Woman  0.2332 ***  0.2333 ***  0.2329 ***  0.2336 *** 
  (0.0253)   (0.02528)   (0.02551)   (0.02531)  
School cost  -7.68e-07   -7.03e-07   -8.16e-07   -6.19e-07  
  (6.33e-06)   (6.30e-06)   (6.39e-06)   (6.30e-06)  
Immigrant backgr.  -0.2032 ***  -0.204 ***  -0.1870 ***  -0.1943 *** 
  (0.04193)   (0.04154)   (0.04499)   (0.04758)  
Parents educ. backgr.  0.4652 ***  0.4651 ***  0.4732 ***  0.4712 *** 
  (0.01901)   (0.01881)   (0.01910)   (0.02041)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)  -0.0003944   -0.0004127   -0.0003664   -0.0004082  
  (0.000328)   (0.0003335)   (0.0003296)   (0.0003342)  
Urban dummy  0.09566   0.09010   0.09134   0.08423  
  (0.07125)   (0.0745)   (0.07237)   (0.07448)  
Population distance  0.0005848 **  0.0006169 **  0.0005887 **  0.0006411 ** 
  (0.0002836)   (0.000302)   (0.0002804)   (0.000302)  
No. of students in school  0.001235 **  0.001212 **  0.001248 **  0.001205 ** 
  (0.0005841)   (0.0005929)   (0.0005804)   (0.0005928)  
Constant  -0.06658   -0.06386   -0.1146   -0.09685  
  (0.3574)   (0.3593)   (0.3597)   (0.3618)  
Selection equation  Selected: Students attending municipal schools 
Woman        -0.04003   -0.03797  
        (0.04242)   (0.04336)  
School cost        -0.0000469   -0.0000471  
        (0.0000381)   (0.0000384)  
Immigrant backgr.        -0.3008 ***  -0.3002 *** 
        (0.1008)   (0.1013)  
Parents educ. backgr.        -0.2891 ***  -0.2882 *** 
        (0.05836)   (0.05848)  
Income (municip., 100s of SEK)        0.004846   0.004857  
        (0.003085)   (0.003123)  
Nod-socialist municip. gov. (dummy)        2.335 ***  2.332 *** 
        (0.8367)   (0.8384)  
Non-socialist vote share        -13.94 **  -13.95 ** 
        (5.934)   (5.985)  
Urban dummy        -0.2902   -0.2926  
        (0.3634)   (0.3651)  
Population distance        -0.002297 **  -0.002302 ** 
        (0.00106)   (0.001066)  
Constant        6.607 ***  6.610 *** 
        (1.656)   (1.657)  
athrho        -0.3851   -0.2278  
        (0.4591)   (0.4764)  
r        -0.3671   -0.224  
        (0.3973)   (0.4525)  
 
Table A2 – Explaining student results. No failing grade (all subjects). 
The table presents results from estimation of the main equation (1), with a dummy variable indicating if the 
student have passing grades in all subjects as the dependent variable. Estimation (I) and (II) ignore self-selection 
and are estimated as probit models, since the dependent variable is dichotomous, while models (III) and (IV) are 
estimated as bivariate probit models with partial observability and with equation (3) forming the selection part of 
the model. Equations (II) and (IV) are estimated using an instrument for the share of students attending 
independent schools. This instrument is constructed using the estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 4. The 
presented standard errors are from robust estimators allowing for clustering. The preferred specification is model 
(I). 